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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction over this

appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(k), Utah Code Ann- (1993), and
pursuant to the Supreme Court's transfer of the appeal pursuant to
Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly extend full faith and

credit to that certain judgment made and entered in the Superior
Court

of

California, County

of Los Angeles, awarding

Hansen

ownership and possession of property located in the town of Alta?
2.

Did

the

trial

court

properly

conclude

that

enforcement of the California judgment is not stayed during the
pendency of an appeal of the judgment due to Fiirmanski's failure
to file a bond or undertaking with the California court?
3.

Did

the

trial

court

abuse

its

discretion

in

invoking specific performance under Ru.le 70 of the Utah Rules of:
Civil Procedure and vesting title to the Alta, Utah property in
Hansen?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.
(i s sues

In reviewing an order granting summary judgment
• i.j

inferei- *^-

:

above),
..

the

Court

" view[ s ] t h e

fact s

•"-:<•• - ••? to I. he losLny party/" arvJ

reviews the district court's legal conclusions for correctness.
Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah
1991).

The Coin: t: wiJ 1 affirm summary judgment i f there are no
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genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law,

Frisbee v. K&K Constr. Co., 676

P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984).
2.

The Court reviews the trial court's order invoking

specific performance under Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure (issue 3 above) under an abuse of discretion standard.
"Specific performance is a remedy of equity which is addressed to
sense of justice and good conscience of court, and, accordingly,
considerable

latitude

of

discretion

is

allowed

in

court's

determination as to whether it shall be granted and what judgment
should be entered in respect thereto..."
P.2d

681, 684

discretion
remedy.

(Utah

1981).

in applying

and

Trial

Morris v. Svkes. 624

judge is granted

formulating

specific

broad

performance

Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979); LHIW,

Inc. v. DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

On August 31, 1989, the Superior Court of California,
County of Los Angeles (the "California Court"), entered a "Further
Judgment on Reserved Issues" (the "Judgment") in a case captioned
Marriage of Petitioner:

Stanley Furmanski and Respondent:

Gail

H. Furmanski: Case No. 0128 811 (the "California Action").

The

Judgment,

in

part,

constitutes

a

division

of

property

in

connection with the dissolution of the marriage between appellee,
Gail

C.

Hansen

("Furmanski").
f ?\riiTK:\iii7\nn^Q9nn m

("Hansen") and

appellant

Stanley

Furmanski

Pursuant to the Judgment, Hansen was awarded
2

certain

real

property

and

the

improvements

thereon

(the

"Property") located in the Town of Alta, State of Utah,
Despite entry of the Judgment almost four years ago,
Furmanski has refused to deed the Property to Hansen.1

Furmanski

filed an appeal from the Judgment with the Court of Appeal of the
State of California, Second Appellate Division, Division 5. That
court affirmed the Judgment.
California

State

Supreme

Then, Furmanski, petitioned the

Court

to undertake

review

of the

Judgment.

The California State Supreme Court denied Furmanski's

petition.

While pursuing the appeal process as to the Judgment,

Furmanski

has never

California

court

as

filed an undertaking
required

under

or bond with the

California

law to stay

enforcement of the Judgment.

furmanski's refusal to deed the Property to Hansen is but
one example, among many, of Furmanski's ongoing efforts to
harass and intimidate Hansen and deprive her of her property.
Familiarity with the background of the California Action is
helpful to an understanding of the lack of merit of this appeal
and Furmanski's rationale for filing it. Therefore, this court
is urged to read in its entirety the opinion of the Court of
Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District,
Division Five, affirming the Judgment, a copy of which opinion
is included in the Addendum to this brief, with a certified copy
found at Pages 265-297 of the Record. The opinion of the
California Court of Appeal is most instructive as to Furmanski's
obstructive tactics, his misuse of the judicial system and his
personal war against Hansen. As stated in Footnote 1 of the
opinion of the California Court of Appeal, "[a] personal wage
was also waged by Furmanski and Ibara [Furmanski's paramour and
subsequent wife] against Hansen. For example, Ibara paid
$25,000 to have Hansen killed, a plot of which Furmanski was
aware and approved. Ibara eventually pled guilty to
solicitation to commit murder. After serving one year in
prison, Ibara was released and subsequently married Furmanski.
During this time, Furmanski was also arrested for burglary of
Hansen's home."
f:\dms\147\0039200.01
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Since enforcement of the Judgment was not stayed, Hansen
filed an action with the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah (the "Utah Court Action") for the sole
purpose of enforcing the Judgment as to the Property.

During the

pendency of the Utah Court Action, Furmanski exhausted the appeal
process of the Judgment in the California courts, and, he then
petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for review of
the Judgment.

Furmanski's Petition for Writ of Certiorari is

presently pending before the Supreme Court. Throughout the appeal
process, Furmanski has taken the position that he is not required
to file a bond or undertaking to stay enforcement of the Judgment
so long as an appeal of the Judgment is pending.
B.

The Course of the Proceedings

On May 3, 1993, the district court entered an order
granting Hansen summary judgment, according the Judgment full
faith and credit in the State of Utah and divesting Furmanski and
his alter ego, Stan Furmanski, M.D., Inc., as to title to the
Property and vesting title in Hansen.

(R. 644-646.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Hansen is an individual residing in the State of

California who claims an ownership interest in the Property.
(R. 306.)
2.

Title to the Property is presently vested in Stan

Furmanski, M.D., Inc. ("Furmanski Corp.").
3.

On August 31, 1989, the Judgment was entered in the

California Action.
f!\dms\147\0fnQ?nn 01

(R. 492.)

(R. 7.) Pursuant to the Judgment, the marital
4

estate of Hansen and Furinanski was distributed and the Property
was awarded to Hansen.

(R. 16.)

4.

Furmanski Corp. is an alter ego of Furmanski.

5.

Furmanski Corp. is not represented in the Utah

(R. 17.)

Court Action by a licensed attorney.
6.

(R. 667-668.)

Furmanski has never filed a bond or undertaking to

stay enforcement of the Judgment.
7.

(R. 674.)

The Judgment which awards the Property to Hansen

has not been vacated, modified or set aside.

(R. 307.) Furmanski

filed an appeal from the Judgment, but such appeal was denied, and
the Judgment affirmed by the Court of Appeal of the State of
California, Second Appellate Division, Division Five.
297).

(R. 265-

The Supreme Court of the State of California denied

Furmanski's petition for review.

(R. 298.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although Furmanski sets forth nine separate issues for
review, the issues are largely redundant of one another and can be
resolved by consideration of the three issues summarized below.
(a) Furmanski argues that the Utah trial court cannot
extend

full

California

faith
court

and
lacked

credit

to

the

jurisdiction

(Furmanski's Issues F and I).

Judgment
over

because

Furmanski

the

Corp.

As will be shown below, the trial

court properly rejected Furmanski's argument and extended full
faith and credit to the Judgment because such argument belonged to
Furmanski Corp., not Furmanski, and could not be argued by
f .\Hme\ni7\nnQnorif\

ni

c

Furmanski pro se. Moreover, even if the jurisdictional claim had
been properly argued in the trial court, on behalf of Furmanski
Corp., the claim was properly rejected since the California Court
specifically reserved jurisdiction over Furmanski Corp. as an
alter ego of Furmanski.
(b)

Furmanski also contends that the trial court erred

in interpreting

California

undertaking

order

in

to

law to require
stay

enforcement

(Furmanski's Issues A, B, C, C-2, G, H and I).
the California

that he

file an

of

Judgment

the

As shown below,

Code of Civil Procedure clearly requires an

undertaking be given to stay enforcement of a judgment directing
disposition of real property. Therefore, the trial court did not
err in its interpretation that the Judgment was not stayed.
(c) Finally, Furmanski contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by divesting the title of Furmanski and
Furmanski Corp. in the Property under Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure (Furmanski's Issue E ) .

Furmanski claims that

relief under Rule 70 was first requested orally in the hearing on
Hansen's motion for summary judgment, and that he was deprived of
the opportunity to prepare opposition to such relief.

We will

show that Furmanski and Furmanski Corp. had adequate notice as to
Hansen's request for Rule 70 relief and that such relief was
properly granted.

f:\dms\147\G039200.01
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As set forth more fully below, the judgment of the trial
court should be affirmed.2
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXTENDED FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT TO THE JUDGMENT.

Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution
obligates the trial court to give "full faith and credit" to the
Judgment.

Transamerica

Title

Insurance

Company

v.

United

Resources, Inc., 471 P.2d 165, 166 (Utah 1970); Fullenwider Co. v.
Patterson, 611 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1980).

While it is true that

extension of full faith and credit to a sister state judgment is
not required where the jurisdiction of the sister state court or
the regularity of its procedures which constitute due process of
law are defective, to the extent such jurisdictional and due
process issues are raised and decided in the sister state action,
the sister state judgment is conclusive as to those issues as
well.

Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 99 (Utah 1986); Fullenwider

Co. v. Patterson, 611 P.2d at 389.

In Ful lenwider Co. v.

Patterson, where the defendant was collaterally
foreign judgment, the court stated:

attacking a

M

[I]f the same issue as to

the jurisdiction of the foreign court was raised and adjudicated

2

As to Furmanski's Issue D, the trial court did not err by
failing to afford Furmanski a jury trial. Despite Furmanskirs
assertion, a review of the Record of the Utah Court Action
indicates he never made demand for trial by jury and never paid
the statutory jury fee. Moreover, enforcement of the Judgment
in Utah presents no triable issues of fact for decision by a
jury. The defenses to enforcement of the Judgment pursued by
Furmanski constitute legal arguments not factual disputes. See
R. 681.
f:\dms\147\0039200.01
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therein, then

the determination

of

that

issue

becomes

res

judicata, and is entitled to full faith and credit, the same as
any other issue that has been so determined."

.Id. at 389.

A review of the Decision (the "Decision") of the Court
of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate Division,
Division 5, makes clear that Furmanski raised jurisdictional and
due process defenses in the California action and in his appeal of
the Judgment, and that such defenses were deemed meritless.3

In

Footnote 10 of the Decision, at page 17, (R. 281), the California
Court of Appeals states as follows:
10/ Appellants make a number of other
contentions, all based upon the assumption
[that]
the
trial
court
lacked
the
jurisdiction to act. Inasmuch as the court
had jurisdiction to act, these contentions
obviously
are without
merit.
Thus,
appellants were not denied due process, the
trial court's judgment is enforceable, the
trial court's judgment has res judicata
effect and is entitled to full faith and
credit and the judgment is not void.
Appellants also contend, citing Northern
Pipeline Const, v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.
(1982) 458 U.S. 50 [102 S.Ct. 2858], the
bankruptcy judge, as a non-article III judge,
was foreclosed from ruling on California
state issues, and thus, he could not make
determinations regarding the division of
community property.
Since the orders
discussed
above
deal
with
federal
jurisdiction this argument has no relevancy.
Jurisdictional issues related to the authority of a nonArticle III judge to adjudicate state law issues were raised by
Furmanski in the California Action and in his appeal of the
Judgment. The California Court of Appeals held such issues to
be irrelevant and meritless. Nevertheless, Furmanski persists
in asserting these issues in an effort to prevent extension of
full faith and credit to the Judgment, as evidenced by Issues C,
D and G in his brief.
f:\dms\147\0039200.01
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We also note that appellants' discussion on
this issue fails to discuss the federal
legislative events after Northern Pipeline.
Having failed to convince the California courts that the Judgment
was

jurisdictionally

defective,

Furmanski

asserts

a

new

jurisdictional issue in the Utah Court Action in order to thwart
extension of full faith and credit to the Judgment.

Furmanski

argues that since Furmanski Corp. was not named and served in the
California Action, the California Court had no authority to order
a divestiture of the corporation's interest in property.4
As he did before the trial court, Furmanski, who is not
a licensed attorney, makes this argument on behalf of Furmanski
Corp.

As stated in Tracy-Burke v. Department of Employment

Security, 699 P.2d 687, 688 (Utah 1985), H[i]t has long been the
law of this

jurisdiction that a corporate litigant must be

represented in court by a licensed attorney."

The reasoning

behind the rule was explained in Tuttle v. Hi-Land Dairyman's
Association, 350 P.2d 616 (Utah 1960) where the court quoted with
approval the following language of Paradise v. Nowlin, 195 P. 2d
867 (Cal. App. 1948):
A composite of the rule in the decided cases,
overwhelmingly sustained by the authorities,
may be thus stated: A natural person may
represent himself and present his own case to
the court although he is not a licensed
attorney.
A corporation is not a natural
person. It is an artificial entity created
by law and as such it can neither practice
law nor appear or act in person.
Out of
court it must act in its affairs through its
agents and representatives and in matters in
A

See Issues F and I in Furmanski's brief.

f:\dms\U7\nmQ9nn ni
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court it can act only through licensed
attorneys. A corporation cannot appear in
court by an officer who is not an attorney
and it cannot appear in propria persona.
[Citations omitted.]
The

argument

that

the

California

court

lacked

jurisdiction over Furmanski Corp. is an argument belonging to the
corporate entity not to Furmanski personally.5

Therefore, since

the corporate entity is not represented by a licensed attorney,
the jurisdictional argument, as well as this appeal, to the extent
it

is

prosecuted

on

behalf

of

Furmanski

Corp.,

must

be

disregarded.
As

an

aside,

however,

even

if

Furmanski

Corp.'s

jurisdictional argument was lawfully presented, the argument would
be meritless since Paragraph 10 on page 11 of the Judgment (R.
17.) decrees that Furmanski Corp. is an alter ego of Furmanski,
and that the California court reserves jurisdiction over such
entity.

Since Furmanski Corp. was deemed

an alter ego of

Furmanski, it was not necessary that Furmanski Corp. be named or
served in the California action.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED CALIFORNIA
LAW AS REQUIRING THE FILING OF AN UNDERTAKING TO
STAY ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT.

Furmanski admitted to the trial court that he has not
filed an undertaking to stay enforcement of the Judgment during

5

The trial court at the hearing on Hansen's motion for
summary judgment repeatedly warned Furmanski that it was a
violation of Utah law for him to come before a Utah court and
represent a corporation. (See R. 672-673.) Despite the trial
court's warnings, Furmanski persists in making arguments on
behalf of his corporation throughout his brief.
•F.\rimc\iA7\nnQoonn m

in

the pendency of his appeal. (R. 674.) He claims that Section 916
of

the

California

Code

of

Civil

Procedure

operates

to

automatically stay enforcement of the Judgment during the pendency
of his appeal.

Section 916 states as follows:

§ 916.
Stay of proceedings on perfecting
appeal; effect. (a) Except as provided in
Sections 917.1 to 917.9, inclusive, and in
Section 116.810, the perfecting of an appeal
stays proceedings in the trial court upon the
judgment or order appealed from or upon the
matters embraced therein or affected thereby,
including enforcement of the judgment or
order, but the trial court may proceed upon
any other matter embraced in the action and
not affected by the judgment or order.
(emphasis added).
Cal. Civil Practice Code § 916 (Deering 1993).
Furmanski in quoting Section 916 in his brief fails to
include that portion of the section which is underscored above in
an attempt to mislead this Court as to California law.

Section

917.4, which constitutes an exception to the general rule as to
stay of proceedings on appeal, states that the perfecting of an
appeal

does

not

stay

enforcement

of

a

judgment

directing

disposition of real property unless an undertaking is given by the
party who is appealing the judgment.

Section 917.4 is stated in

pertinent part as follows:
§ 917.4. Undertaking to stay enforcement of;
judgment or order directing disposition of
real property pending appeal. The perfecting
of an appeal shall not stay enforcement of
the judgment or order in the trial court if
the judgment or order appealed from directs
the
sale, conveyance
or
delivery
of
possession of real property which is in the
possession or control of the appellant or the
party ordered to sell, convey or deliver
f:\dms\147\0039200.01
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possession of the property, unless an
undertaking in a sum fixed by the trial court
is given that the appellant or party ordered
to sell, convey or deliver possession of the
property will not commit or suffer to be
committed any waste thereon and that if the
judgment or order appealed from is affirmed,
or the appeal is withdrawn or dismissed, the
appellant shall pay the damage suffered by
the waste and the value of the use and
occupancy of the property, or the part of it
as to which the judgment or order is
affirmed, from the time of the taking of the
appeal until the delivery of the possession
of the property.
Cal. Civil Practice Code § 917.4
1993).

(Deering

That portion of the Judgment which Hansen seeks to
enforce by the Utah Court Action relates to a conveyance of real
property as part of the property settlement between Hansen and
Furmanski in connection with their divorce. Section 917.4 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure clearly controls as to the
issue of whether an undertaking is required to stay enforcement of
the Judgment at least as to those portions of the Judgment which
relate to the disposition of real property.
As stated by the court in Tradesman's Nat. Bank & Trust
Co.

v. Cumminas Bros. Co., 157 A. 386, 387 (Sup.Ct. N.J. 1931),

"[t]he pendency of an appeal does not prevent an action on a
foreign judgment if the appeal does not operate as a supersedeas,
or stay of proceedings in the jurisdiction where it was rendered
or

if

there has not been a compliance with

the requisite

conditions to obtain supersedeas." As set forth above, California
law requires the filing of an undertaking to stay enforcement of
a judgment directing disposition of real property.
f«\HnK\i47\nfttQ?nn m

12

Furmanski has

never filed the requisite undertaking to stay enforcement of the
Judgment as to the Property.

Therefore, despite the pendency

before the U.S. Supreme Court of his petition

for writ of

certiorari, the Judgment, as a matter of law, is presently
enforceable in Utah.6
III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
INVOKED SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE UNDER RULE 70 OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Despite Furmanski's contention in Issue E of his brief,
Hansen's request that the trial court employ Rule 70 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure was not first made orally in the hearing
on April 19, 1993.

Rather, Hansen, in Section II. C. of the

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of her motion for
summary judgment, which Memorandum was served upon Furmanski and
Furmanski Corp., urged the Court to specifically enforce the
Judgment

by making use of Rule 70.7

(R. 259-260.)

Since

6

Furmanski's Issue A urges error by the trial court in
calling the Judgment res judicata. Whether the Judgment is
technically res judicata as a matter of law while an appeal is
pending is not the determinative issue. The critical issue is
whether the Judgment is enforceable in Utah during the pendency
of Furmanski's appeal. Under Section 917.4 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure, the Judgment is not stayed unless an
undertaking is given. Therefore, the trial court did not err in
its ruling.
7

Rule 70. Judgment for specific acts; vesting title.
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance
of land or to deliver deeds or other documents or to
perform any other specific act and the party fails to
comply within the time specified, the court may direct
the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient
party by some other person appointed by the court and
the act when so done has like effect as if done by the
(continued...)

f:\dms\147\0039200.01
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Furmanski had adequate notice that Hansen had requested Rule 70
relief, he had ample opportunity to argue against it and no
violation of procedural due process exists.

Additionally, Rule

70, by its own terms, does not require any sort of notice before
it may be exercised.
are

entirely

specifically
parties.

within

Implementation of the provisions of the Rule
the

enforcing

court's

court

discretion

orders

as

as

against

a means

of

disobedient

As stated in Morris v. Svkes, 624 P. 2d 681 at 684,

M

[s]pecific performance is a remedy of equity which is addressed

to the sense of justice and good conscience of the court, and
accordingly, considerable latitude of discretion is allowed in his
determination as to whether it shall be granted and what judgment
should be entered in respect thereto; and his ruling thereon
should not be upset on appeal unless it clearly appears that he
has abused his discretion. . . . "

7

(...continued)
party. On application of the party entitled to
performance and upon order of the court, the clerk
shall issue a writ of attachment or sequestration
against the property of the disobedient party to
compel obedience to the judgment. The court may also
in proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If
real or personal property is within the state, the
court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may
enter a judgment divesting the title of any party and
vesting it in others and such judgment has the effect
of a conveyance executed in due form of law. When any
order or judgment is for the delivery of possession,
the party in whose favor it is entered is entitled to
a writ of execution or assistance upon application to
the clerk.
Rule 70, U.R.C.P.

f .\Hmc\iA7\nma9nn ni
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Furmanski's history of non-compliance with court orders
and his vindictiveness towards Hansen gave the trial court good
cause to believe that he would not voluntarily convey the Property
despite the court's granting of summary judgment in favor of
Hansen•

The trial

court did not abuse

its discretion in

determining that use of Rule 70 was appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Furmanski and Furmanski Corp. have presented no evidence
or argument that justifies reversal of the trial court's decisions
below. The trial court properly extended full faith and credit to
the Judgment since there were no genuine issues of material fact
as to the California Court's jurisdiction and, as a matter of law,
the pendency of Furmanski's appeal of the Judgment did not
automatically stay enforcement of the Judgment as to the Property.
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in invoking
Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to specifically
enforce the conveyance of the Property in light of Furmanski's
past refusal to voluntarily convey title.

The trial court's

decision should be affirmed.
DATED this

day of August, 1993.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Branch
Attorneys for Appellee
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE

In re Marriage of STANLEY and
GAIL HANSEN FURMANSKI.

)

B043231
( S u p e r . Ct. No. D128811
C o n s o l i d a t e d W/SWC92313,
C589851 and SWC92313)

STANLEY FURMANSKI,
Cross-defendant cind
Appellant,

)

V •

GAIL HANSEN FURMANSKI,
Cross-complainant : and
Respondent;

COURT OF APPEAL-SECOND DIST

)

F if ir. n? 0
NOV 1 0 1992
JOSEZ. HERALDEZ

KAREN IBARA et al.,
Third Party Claimants,
Cross-defendants and
Appellants;

Clerk

Deputy Clerk

)
)
)

ALDA SHELTON,
Objector and Appellant.

)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County.

James G. Kolts, Judge.

Affirmed.

Stanley Furmanski, in pro. per., for Cross-defendant

and Appellant.
Karen Ibara, in pro. per., and Stanley G. Patnoi for
Third Party Claimants, Cross-defendants and Appellants.
Alda Shelton, in pro. per., and Irwin Buter for
Objector and Appellant.
Spector, Buter, Hoberman & Buzard, Irwin Buter and
Gary Brown for Cross-complainant and Respondent.

Appellants Stanley Furmanski, Karen Ibara and Ibara
Land Trading Co. (Ibara Land) appeal from a further judgment on
reserved issues in favor of respondent Gail Hansen filed on
August 31, 1989. Attorney Alda Shelton appeals from an order
imposing $2,500 in sanctions.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Furmanski and Hansen (formerly Gail Hansen Furmanski),
both physicians specializing in radiology, were married on
December 21, 1974,
for dissolution.

In October 1984, Furmanski filed a petition

Furmanski and Hansen's status of marriage was

terminated on October 7, 1985.

In the years that followed, a

war involving the distribution of assets was waged.1/

During

this time, Furmanski*s new wife Karen Ibara, claimed that

i^ A personal war was also waged by Furmanski and Ibara
against Hansen. For example, Ibara paid $25,000 to have Hansen
(Footnote continued.)

community property located in Manhattan Beach belonged to her,
or her corporation, Ibara Land.

Ibara filed a civil suit on

her behalf and on behalf of Ibara Land claiming this property.
Hansen cross-complained, asserting numerous causes of action,
including fraud.

This civil suit was consolidated with the

dissolution action and other civil suits.

Questions persisted

as to the property rights of Furmanski, Ibara, Ibara Land and
Hansen, including the ownership rights to 2206 and 2206 1/2 The
Strand, two condominiums located on the same lot.

Further,

during the pendency of the actions, Furmanski and Ibara filed
numerous bankruptcy petitions, writ petitions, and one appeal,
all in an effort to delay the final adjudication of the issues
and to deprive Hansen of her property.-2/
On May 24, 1989, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 128.5, attorney Alda Shelton, who represented Ibara
Land, was sanctioned $2,500.
Finally, on August 31, 1989, the court resolved the

killed, a plot of which Furmanski was aware and approved.
Ibara eventually pled guilty to solicitation to commit murder.
After serving one year in prison, Ibara was released and
subsequently married Furmanski. During this time, Furmanski
was also arrested for burglary of Hansen's home.
2/ In an unpublished opinion filed April 24, 1992 (B042426),
we upheld the May 19, 1989 orders directing Furmanski and Ibara
to vacate the condominium located at 2206 1/2 The Strand in
Manhattan Beach and ordering Furmanski to pay Hansen $300,000
in attorney's fees. Reluctantly, we reversed other orders on
the ground the state court lacked jurisdiction to issue those
orders because the matter had been removed to the federal court.
We take judicial notice of this previous appeal.
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remaining property issues by entering a further judgment on
reserved issues.

In this judgment:

(1) Furmanski was ordered

to pay Hansen the sum of $230,000 in attorney fees, which sum
was in addition to the $300,000 previously ordered; (2) certain
property was awarded to Furmanski; (3) certain property was
awarded to Hansen, including the real property located at 2206
and 2206 1/2 The Strand, Manhattan Beach; (4) Furmanski was
found to have misappropriated $37,000 in community funds; (5)
Furmanski was given credit for specified lease payments; and
(6) it was found that numerous entities and/or corporations
were the alter ego of Furmanski, including Supersoft, Inc.

In

reaching its conclusions, the court wrote an extensive
statement of decision which included a finding that Furmanski
and Ibara engaged in a conspiracy to defraud Hansen out of the
property located at 2206 The Strand.
Appellants Furmanski, Ibara and Ibara Land contend
they were denied a jury trial and the state court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the August 31, 1989 order because the
matter was removed to federal court.

Furmanski additionally

contends the court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay
$230,000 in attorney's fees and the division of property was
not equal.

Ibara and Ibara Land further contend the court's

finding of fraud is unsupported by the record, and thus, Hansen
should not have received the property at 2206 The Strand.
Attorney Shelton appeals from the order imposing sanctions.
Additional facts will be discussed where pertinent.

DISCUSSION
Jury Trial
The contention of Furmanski, Ibara and Ibara Land that
they were denied a jury trial has no merit.

Assuming this case

involved matters which entitled appellants to a jury trial,
appellants have waived their right to assert this issue on
appeal.-2/
Although written demands for a jury trial were filed^/
in March of 1988, appellants have waived their right to assert
this issue on appeal because appellants did not object or make
a request for a jury trial at the time trial was commenced
without a jury.

(Escamilla v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn.

(1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 53, 58-64.)
Furmanski was sworn and testified.
stand, the trial began.

On February 21, 1989,
When a witness took the

(Haxtman v. Santamarina (1982) 30

Cal.3d 762, 765; Miller & Lux Inc. v. Superior Court (1923) 192
Cal. 333, 342.)

When appellants did not assert their demand

for a jury trial at this time, their right to assert this issue
on appeal was waived.5/

3/ There is no right to a jury trial in a dissolution action,
although the court has the power to order any issue of fact to
be tried by a jury. (Code Civ. P r o c , § 592; In re Marriage of
Kim (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 364, 373.) In this case, the
consolidated civil actions between Furmanski and Hansen were
appropriately part of the dissolution action.
4/ The record reflects demands for jury trial filed by
Furmanski, Ibara and Ibara Land.
5/

We also note that this issue was decided adversely to

(Footnote continued.)

Appellants argue that no one understood the trial had
commenced when Furmanski took the stand, they were misled into
believing Furmanski1s limited testimony was given only to
protect the five-year statute of limitations, no waiver was
intended nor understood, and they requested a jury trial at the
appropriate time.

These arguments misconstrue the record.

Furmanski took the stand on February 21; thereafter,
the parties appeared numerous times.

Even though no testimony

was taken during these short appearances, it was noted that the
trial had already begun.

Thus, appellants had numerous

opportunities to announce their desire for a jury trial.
When the matter was called for trial on February 21,
1989, the parties agreed to a continuance so Furmanski could make
financial arrangements which "may arise out of this litigation;
and that this continuance is authorizing contemplation of a
settlement being effected at that time.

Mf]

The court was

further [i]nsured by all parties that there would be no motions
filed, no appeals, no writs sought or further discovery between
now and that date.

Mf]

It is also [the court's] understanding

that [Hansen] was desirous of preventing any possibility that
the five[-]year statute might run and therefore wishes to call
[Furmanski] simply to start the proceedings underway . . . .*
Furmanski was called to the stand, sworn, and testified as to
his address.

The case was continued.

appellants in the previous appeal and is, therefore, law of the
case.

The parties next appeared on March 6, 1989, during
which time the court addressed, among other issues, the
representation of Ibara Land.

During this discussion, one

attorney stated "we're in trial already . . . we have started
trial."

Furmanski's counsel also acknowledged the trial had

begun when he stated "part of [the settlement meetings] was
that no trial would go forward."

During the settlement

discussions, appellants did not inform the court that they had
filed a writ petition on that same day.

On March 7, 1989,

proceedings apparently were held, but the matter could not
proceed because the court of appeal issued a stay upon the
filing of a writ petition the previous day.
On March 22, 1989, the parties appeared; it was noted
the matter had been continued, but it could not proceed because
a stay had been issued by this court.

The parties again

appeared on March 27, 1989, at which time Furmanski's attorney
requested she be relieved as counsel.

In objecting to the

motion, Furmanski noted, "it is my understanding the trial has
already started and to relieve her of the obligation to be
present at trial would severely hamper my case . . . . H
Hansen's attorney also noted, "In addition, as Dr. Furmanski
has noted, trial has commenced, the stay has been lifted, and
[Hansen] is ready to proceed to trial as scheduled on March 29
....'•

The court then asked Furmanski if another bankruptcy

action had been filed.

Furmanski was evasive and did not

directly respond to the court's inquiry.

Only after the court

informed Furmanski he could be held in contempt, did Furmanski
inform the court that bankruptcy documents had been sent to the
federal court.

Two days later, on March 29, 1989, the parties

again appeared, discussed the most recent bankruptcy filing and
the fact that Hansen would be filing an ex parte application
for relief from stay.^/

On March 31, 1989, the parties

appeared at 10:40 a.m., and it was confirmed that the
bankruptcy stay had been lifted.

The issue of a jury trial was

raised only after the court stated it would recess until 1:30
p.m., to allow Furmanski*s counsel to get her records.

The

court denied the request for a jury trial, noting that trial
had already commenced.

Thus, contrary to appellants'

suggestion, there were numerous times when the parties
acknowledged the trial had commenced and numerous opportunities
for appellants to request a jury trial.

No one was misled;

everyone understood the posture of the case.

Everyone knew

that when Furmanski took the stand, the trial began.
Additionally, the court did not abuse its discretion
(March v. Pettis (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 473, 478; Winston v.
Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 600, 602) in refusing to
grant relief from the waiver of a jury.
§ 631, subd. (d).)

(Code Civ. Proc,

The facts above amply demonstrate appellants

had over one month, from February 21, 1989 (the date the matter

-£/ Hansen's attorney indicated he was "apprised of the
potential of Dr. Furmanski [and] his wife doing their fourth
bankruptcy filing, two by him, two by her . . . .H

_Q_

was originally set for trial), until March 31, 1989 (the date
additional testimony was given), to assert their jury requests
During that time, appellants postured in the bankruptcy court,
the court of appeal and the trial court delaying the case.
These actions were contrary to the promises made to the trial
court on February 21, 1989, that no other actions would be
taken if the matter was continued.

In light of the history of

this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to grant relief from the waiver of a jury.

(March v.

Pettis, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 480 [relief from waiver of
jury trial properly denied if it is "used as a 'pretext to
obtain continuances and thus trifle with justice'"].)
Appellants also point to a motion for severance and
request for jury trial to argue all parties knew a jury trial
was being requested.

However, this motion was not filed until

March 31, 1991, the date the trial was to reconvene and more
than a month after the matter was originally set for trial.
This filing simply demonstrates another delay tactic used by
appellants.^/

//
//
//

1/
Appellants have failed to cite any authority for their
contention it was the court's responsibility to indicate a jury
trial could be waived.
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Removal
The trial court entered its judgment on August 31,
1989.

We are unpersuaded by appellants1 contention the court

lacked the jurisdiction to enter this judgment because the
matter had been removed to federal court.
We outline in chronological order the pertinent events:
On October 29, 1984, Furmanski filed the dissolution
action, case no. D128811.

On March 7, 1986, Ibara and Ibara

Land filed their contract complaint, case no. SWC83958.
cases, along with cross-actions, were consolidated.

These

On April 7,

1989, Furmanski filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, case
no. LA89-07391SB.
On March 31, 1989, the bankruptcy court issued the
following order:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

Mf]

1.

The

automatic stay, arising by virtue of 11 U.S.C.A. Section 362 is
hereby terminated nunc pro tunc as of March 21, 1989 to permit
Gail Hansen . . . to proceed to trial in all pending state
court actions.

[If] 2.

Said relief is for the sole purpose of

allowing [Hansen] to proceed to trial and to liquidate her
claims against [Furmanski].

During the pendency of this

bankruptcy proceeding, [Hansen] is precluded from executing
upon any judgment received in the state court actions without
further order of this court.

Mf]

3.

Any automatic stay which

arises by virtue of any bankruptcy petition filed by either
Stanley Furmanski, Karen Ibara, or Ibara Land Trading Company,
Inc. is to have no force and effect as against [Hansen] for the

purpose of proceeding to trial for 180 days from entry of this
order."
On August 16, 1989, Ibara filed a petition for removal
of action to United States District Court requesting that civil
case no. D128811, consolidated with other cases, be removed to
the federal bankruptcy court.

Ibara claimed her civil claims

should be resolved in the bankruptcy court in case
no. LA89-07391SB.

The docket sheet of the California Superior

Court reflects the superior court received Ibara1s notice of
removal of case no. D128811 to the United States District
Court.

The petition stated the case was removed "effective

upon the filing of this notice . . . ."
On August 31, 1989, the superior court issued the
judgment on further issues in the state court, from which
appellants appeal.
On October 23, 1989, the federal court remanded
Ibara*s matter to the bankruptcy court.
On February 16, 1990, the parties appeared at an in
camera proceeding in the bankruptcy court, at which time Ibara
and Furmanski claimed the state court proceedings had been
removed to the federal court and thus, any state judgment
(including the August 31, 1989 judgment) was void.

In a

March 13, 1990 order, the bankruptcy court summarized the
events, rejected appellants* claim and decreed that the state
court judgment was valid.
The March 13, 1990 order reads in part:

"[T]he

parties brought to the attention of the Court and raised
certain issues in respect of the effect and validity of certain
pronouncements, Judgments and Orders issued by the Honorable
James G. Kolts, Judge of the Superior Court for the County of
Los Angeles, State of California, filed and entered on May 19,
1989 and August 31, 1989, in the context of a certain State
Court marital dissolution action . . . and three civil actions
consolidated therewith . . . .

[If]

The Court having been

advised of the purported removal of the Consolidated Actions,
[If]

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS:

Mf]

[That trial on the

consolidated actions commenced on February 21, 1989, that
Furmanski filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy action on February 28,
1989, which was thereafter dismissed, that Furmanski then filed
another Chapter 13 Bankruptcy petition, that the bankruptcy
court's order of March 31, 1989, entered nunc pro tunc
authorized the parties to proceed in the state court, that the
second Chapter 13 petition was dismissed when Furmanski failed
to comply with his debtor obligations, that prior to the
dismissal of the second bankruptcy petition Furmanski filed
this Chapter 11 petition, that trial in the California court
proceeded in reliance on the federal court's order in which
Furmanski and Hansen actively participated, that Judge Kolts
issued a memorandum of intended decision, that] [s]ubsequent to
the issuance of the Memorandum of Intended Decision, but prior
to the August 31, 1989 entry of the Statement of Decision
(Exhibit •4') • . . on or about August 16, 1989, without notice

to or service upon Dr. Hansen, or counsel therefor, Ibara,
[Furmanski's] present spouse, purported to remove the
Consolidated Actions to the United States District Court . . .
Mf] Ibara and [Furmanski] have contended in the course of the
conference . . . that, as a result of the removal, the State
Court's pronouncements, Judgments and Orders annexed hereto are
not valid or binding,

Mf]

BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, and it

appearing in the best interest of the proper administration of
this estate, the principles of judicial economy, and the
doctrine of comity, it is hereby [If] ORDER [ED], ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED, that the pronouncements, Judgments and Orders annexed
hereto [including the August 31, 1989 decision] are valid,
binding, enforceable, adopted by this Court and so entered,
and, it is further Mf] ORDERED, that, notwithstanding the
pendency of this Chapter 11 case, at such time as the remand of
the Consolidated Actions to the State Court is effected, the
State Court shall have the full right, power and authority to
amend, modify, alter or enforce the foregoing pronouncements,
Judgments and Orders adopted and entered by this Court as may
be appropriate under the circumstances."
On May 10, 1990, the bankruptcy court filed a
supplemental order of clarification.

This supplemental order

reaffirmed its prior decision that the state court had the
jurisdiction to act, determined that Hansen could proceeci with
her action in state court and additionally permitted Hansen to
claim assets of Furmanski's bankruptcy estate to satisfy any

court orders.

The supplemental order said in pertinent part:

"[I]t is hereby ORDERED, that the Bankruptcy Court shall retain
jurisdiction to determine claims of creditors, except for those
claims of Gail C. Hansen, M.D., which determination has
heretofore been made by the State court in its Statement of
Decision dated August 31, 1989, and to distribute assets of the
estate to pay those claims . . . and it is further ORDERED,
that nothing in this Order is intended to, nor does it in any
way alter, amend or affect the parties' rights to appeal the
pending State Court pronouncements, Judgments or Orders, seek
the reconsideration of such State Court pronouncements,
Judgments or Orders, seek the modification of any such State
Court pronouncements, Judgments or Orders or take any other
action in the State Court as it affects said State Court
pronouncements, Judgments or Orders, and it is further ORDERED
that other than as noted herein the prior Order shall remain in
full force and effect."
Appellants cite to, among other authority, 28 U^S.C.
section 1446, Laouna Village, Inc. v. Laborers' Internat. Union
of North America (1983) 35 Cal.3d 174 and Suqimoto v.
Exportadora de Sal (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 165, to argue the
August 31, 1989 state court judgment is void because the matter
was removed to the federal court as soon as the petition for
removal was filed with the federal court.
28 U.S.C. section 1446 governs removal to state
courts.

It makes removal effective upon the filing of a

petition of removal in the federal court, the service of the
petition on the courts and the parties.^

Thus, "[w]hen a

removal petition is filed and proper notice is given, the
entire case is transferred to the federal district court,M
(Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (11th Cir.1988) 861 F.2d 1248,
1251.)
The issue as to whether removal voided the August 31,
1989 judgment has been raised and resolved in the bankruptcy
court.

The bankruptcy court orders of March 31, 1989,

March 13, 1990, and May 10, 1990, indicate the bankruptcy court
specifically examined the issue as to whether the case was
removed to the federal court which would have deprived the
state court of the jurisdiction to proceed with Hansen's
claims.

The bankruptcy court, which had all information before

it necessary to make such a determination, specifically gave
the state court the power to proceed, found the federal court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, determined the

Section 1446 reads in part: (a) A defendant or defendants
desiring to remove any civil action . , . from a State court
shall file in the district court of the Untied States for the
district and division . . . a notice of removal signed pursuant
to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
containing a shorthand plain statement of the grounds for
removal/ together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and
orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such
action. Mf] (d) Promptly after the filing of such petition
for the removal of a civil action and bond the defendant or
defendants shall give written notice thereof to all adverse
parties and shall file a copy of the petition with the clerk of
such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State
court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is
remanded."
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state court's judgments, including the August 31, 1989 decree,
were valid and enforceable.

The bankruptcy court has already

examined the federal laws and concluded the state court
judgments and orders were not void.

We must give full faith

and credit "to a final order or judgment of a federal court.
[Citations.]

Such an order or judgment has the same effect in

the courts of this state as it would in federal court.
[Citations.]

In the federal jurisdiction, the doctrine of res

judicata prevents the readjudication of all matters (including
jurisdiction) which were, or might have been, litigated in a
prior proceeding between the same parties."

(Lew v. Cohen

(1977) 19 Cal.3d 165, 172-173; U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1.)
Thus, we are bound by the decisions on this issue made in the
bankruptcy court.2/

(366-368 Geary St., L.P. v. Superior Court

(1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1186, 1197.)
In contending the state court could not proceed,
appellants also discuss other actions in the bankruptcy court,

2/ Furmanski, in effect, concedes the bankruptcy court orders
resolved the issues when he argues that Hansen "submitted to
the jurisdiction of the federal court on the issue of
removal." Additionally, appellants erroneously suggest the
bankruptcy judge could not give full faith and credit to the
August 31, 1989 judgment, since it was void and since the state
court's decision was on appeal it could not be conclusive.
However, the bankruptcy court was not giving full faith and
credit to the state court judgment or determining if it was
conclusive on that court; rather, the bankruptcy court
evaluated appellants* argument that the case was removed,
rejected that argument, and found the state court order was
enforceable. As appellants conceded, the federal courts have
the jurisdiction to determine if the removal was proper.
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such as a relief from stay motion made by Hansen.

However,

having not cited to any evidence to support these contentions,
we need not evaluate the discussions based thereon.
(Huntington Landmark Adult Community Assn. v. Ross (1989) 213
Cal.App.3d 1012, 1021; Atchley v. Citv of Fresno (1984) 151
Cal.App.3d 635, 647; Rossiter v. Benoit (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d
706, 710-711.)

Appellants further argue Hansen acquiesced to

the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court by filing a claim in
that court.

However, appellants1 citation to the record to

support this argument is to a proof of claim, a document filed
by Hansen's attorneys for themselves as creditors for unpaid
attorney's fees.

This document was not filed by Hansen nor can

it be interpreted to suggest Hansen acquiesced to the bankruptcy
court with regard to her property claims.-i-2/
We conclude the August 31, 1989 judgment is valid

ifi/ Appellants make a number of other contentions, all based
upon the assumption the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to
act. Inasmuch as the court had jurisdiction to act, these
contentions obviously are without merit. Thus, appellants were
not denied due process, the trial court's judgment is
enforceable, the trial court's judgment has res judicata effect
and is entitled to full faith and credit and the judgment is
not void.
Appellants also contend, citing Northern Pipeline Const, v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 50 [102 S.Ct. 2858], the
bankruptcy judge, as a non-article III judge, was foreclosed
from ruling on California state issues, and thus, he could not
make determinations regarding the division of community
property. Since the orders discussed above deal with federal
jurisdiction, this argument has no relevancy. We also note
that appellants' discussion on this issue fails to discuss the
federal legislative events after Northern Pipeline.

Attorney's Fees
We are not persuaded by Furmanski1s contention the
court abused its discretion (In re Marriage of Sullivan (1984)
37 Cal.3d 762, 768-769; In re Marriage of Hublou (1991) 231
Cal.App.3d 956, 965) in awarding Hansen an additional sum of
$230,000 in attorney's fees.11/
The court's 43-page statement of decision of the award
fully explained the reasons supporting this award.

The

testimony of Hansen's attorney, as well as other facts,
provided the evidence.

As the court noted, Hansen's need was

demonstrated as was Furmanski's ability to pay because, among
other reasons, Hansen incurred at least $580,000 in fees,
Hansen was forced to borrow money to make payments, Furmanski
grossed approximately three times as much per year as Hansen
and Furmanski put forth a scheme to claim his income was
depressed.

The court also found the overwhelming majority of

Hansen's attorney's fees were due to Furmanski's obstructive
tactics including the filing of numerous suits, one of which
was a sham and one of which was collusive, Furmanski's lack of
cooperation during the discovery process, Furmanski's defective
and confusing pleadings, the delays caused by the misuse of the
bankruptcy courts and the numerous civil actions, disruption

11/ In the prior appeal (case no. B042426), we affirmed the
preliminary order directing Furmanski to pay Hansen $300,000 in
attorney's fees. (See fn. 1 above.)

caused by the use of writ proceedings, and Furmanski's refusal
to answer questions during trial, which caused additional
delay.

The court also found Hansen's testimony was credible on

this issue, whereas Furmanski's was not.

(See discussion In re

Marriage of Huhlou. supra, 231 Cal.App.3d 956.)
Hansen's trial attorney testified his firm had
represented Hansen since the inception of the litigation in
1984.

He testified that although the case was not complex,

Furmanski did everything possible to prolong and complicate the
division of the over $4,000,000 in assets. These disruptive
actions included filing a variety of suits, voluminous pleadings
and exhibits and motions, attempting to hide assets through
corporations for which either Furmanski or Ibara fronted/
obstructing discovery, transferring property in violation of
court orders, and refusing to settle.

For only the second time

in his thirty-year career, attorney Buter was forced to utilize
a second attorney during trial. All of these events resulted
in attorney's t€^es and eosii.> incurred in excess ut $582»-b7.
Since Buter's testimony was found to be credible, an evaluation
left to the trier of fact, we do not find persuasive Furmanski's
suggestion thdt the tees were not incurred.
These reasons, in addition to the fact that attorney's
fees may be assessed under a dissolution proceeding as a result
of litigating intertwined issues in consolidated actions (In re
Marriage of Seaman & Meniou (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1497; In
re Marriage of Green (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 14, 28, fn. 8; In re

Marriage of Siller (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 36; Guardianship of
Paduano (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 346, 350-352), amply support the
attorney's fee award and demonstrate it was not excessive.

(in

re Marriage of Melone (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 757, 763-766 [in
awarding attorney's fees proper for court to consider actions
which increased cost of litigation].)

Additionally, contrary

to Furmanski's contention, in determining the amount of
attorney's fees to be paid by Furmanski, the court did consider
Hansen's income, savings and ability to pay.

Division of Community Property
Furmanski also contends the court did not equally
divide the community property.

Furmanski bases his argument on

this issue on two assertions:

(1) the court undervalued the two

Strand properties as worth $600,000 and $650,000, and (2) Super
Soft, Inc. was the owner of 2206 1/2 The Strand and not him.
To support his first claim, Furmanski points to the
testimony of his expert who testified the two Strand properties
were worth $775,000 and $750,000, respectively.

However,

Furmanski fails to acknowledge that exhibit 1115, an appraisal
of the property, and Hansen's appraiser valued the properties
at $600,000 and $650,000 respectively, and Hansen's appraiser
was found to be more credible than Furmanski's.

Additionally,

Hansen testified, without objection, that she believed 2206 The
Strand was worth anywhere between $500,000 and $600,000 and

-?0-

2206 1/2 The Strand was worth approximately $650,000 to
$750,000.

The court was free to disbelieve Furmanski's expert

and believe the other evidence on this issue.

There was

substantial evidence to support the court's conclusion.
Additionally, inasmuch as the trial court found that
Supersoft, Inc. was Furmanski's alter ego, Furmanski was in
effect the owner of 2206 1/2 The Strand.

Thus, Furmanski is

foreclosed from arguing he did not own the property.12/
Ibara and Ibara Land also assert for the first time in
their joint reply brief the community property was not equally
divided.

These parties do not, however, cite any authority

which gives them standing to assert issues dealing with the
marriage between Furmanski and Hansen.

Further, no authority

is provided to support the allegation that the court could not
award the liquid assets to Hansen; there are no citations to
the record to show the absence of substantial evidence to
support the court's evaluations of Furmanski's medical practice
and the Mulhoi1 and property.
arguments.

Thus, we need not address thesf

(Huntington Landmark Adult Community Assn. v

Ross.

supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 1021; Atchley v. City of Fresno,
supra, 151 fal.App.^d at

p. 647; Rossiter v. Benoit, supra, 88

— / Approximately one and one-half years after the state court
order dividing the marital property, the bankruptcy court
removed a stay so Hansen and Union Federal Savings Bank could
exercise their rights after foreclosure sale. Tn issuing its
order, the bankruptcy court concluded that title to 2206 1/2
The Strand was vested 95 percent with Super Soft, Inc. and,
thus, could not be part of Furmanski's bankruptcy estate.

** i

Cal.App.3d at p. 710-711.)

We do note, however, that the trial

court found Hansen's valuation expert to be more reliable than
Furmanski*s as to the fair market value of the Mulholland
property, and the only expert testimony on the value of
Furmanski's medical practice was presented by Hansen,

Fraud Against Ibara and Ibara Land
The action brought by Ibara and Ibara Land claimed
entitlement to the condominium located at 2206 The Strand,
Hansen cross-complained for fraud.

The basis for the Ibara

claim was a repurchase option signed by Hansen and Furmanski
purportedly giving Ibara Land the right to purchase the
property for $300,000.

The court determined the repurchase

option (which was purportedly exercised after Furmanski filed
his dissolution petition) was fraudulently obtained and that
neither Ibara nor Ibara Land had any rights to the property.
On appeal, Ibara and Ibara Land contend there is no
substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion of
fraud.

We find no merit to this contention.
All of the following facts were shown by the

evidence:

In 1978, Furmanski and Hansen wished to purchase

2206 The Strand.

Hansen believed Furmanski when he stated

there would be a tax advantage if the purchase of the 2206 The

13/ There were three units on this parcel of property; 2206 The
(Footnote continued.)

Strand property was structured such that it was first
transferred from the present owners to a third entity, which
would in turn, transfer the property to Furmanski and Hansen.
Furmanski handled the family business affairs and Hansen had no
reason to disbelieve Furmanski.

Hansen had no reason to be

concerned because she trusted him.

Furmanski told Hansen she

should "not . . . worry, that everything was okay and this
would be a better way to do it."

Furmanski told Hansen a woman

with whom he worked, Ibara, would assist them with the
transaction and that Hansen could trust Ibara.
The owners of 2206 The Strand signed an option with
Ibara Land for the price of $10. On the day the property was
bought by Ibara Land for $183,000, Ibara Land, in turn, sold
the property to Furmanski and Hansen.

What Furmanski did not

tell Hansen was that when she signed the escrow papers to
purchase the unit, she also signed a document, a repurchase
option, which gave Ibara Land (an Oregon corporation set up by
Furmanski) an option to repurchase the property for $300,000,
Had Hansen known of the repurchase agreement, Hansen would not
have agreed to the arrangement and she would not have signed
the document.^/

While Hansen was signing the documents,

Strand was the middle tier and 2206 1/2 The Strand was on the
third, or top level. The top unit (2206 1/2 The Strand) had
the better view, After purchasing 2206 The Strand, 2206 1/2
The Strand was bought with intent that the two units would be
joined.
14/ The document read in part:

"In consideration of this

(Footnote continued.)
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Furmanski assured Hansen all documents were in order, and she
should "just sign them."

Ibara was not present when Hansen

signed the documents; Hansen did not meet Ibara until later.
Furmanski also did not inform Hansen he had been having an
affair with Ibara for many years.
At the time, Ibara was 22 years old.
experience in real estate.

She had no

She was ignorant of most of the

details of the incorporation which created Ibara Land.

As the

court noted, Furmanski, with the assistance of Ibara,
fraudulently constructed the sales transaction such that Ibara
Land could repurchase the property.

Hansen trusted Furmanski

and, thus, believed him when he stated that all documents were
in order and she should Mjust sign" it.

Because Furmanski

handled all marital business affairs, Hansen reasonably relied
upon him and is entitled to rescind the transaction.

(Danzig

v. Jack Grynberg & Associates (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1138;
Joraensen v. Joraensen (1948) 32 Cal.2d 13, 19-23.)

Although a

person usually cannot avoid provisions of written documents by
not reading them (Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club (1986) 186
Cal.App.3d 1309, 1318; Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
(1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 710), a person is not bound to such

agreement, whereby Purchasers gain title to the Property, the
Purchasers (Stanley and Gail H. Furmanski), hereby grant a
REPURCHASE OPTION to the Ibara Land Trading Company Inc.,
(optionee), which option shall be a sole and exclusive option
to Ibara Land Trading Company Inc., or its assigns to repurchase
the property during the option term of seven years from this
date [December 28, 1978] at a fixed sales price of $300,000
cash."

provisions if there is fraud.

(Danzig v. Jack Grvnberg &

Associates, supra, at p. 1138; Bolanos v. Khalatian (1991) 231
Cal.App.3d 1586, 1590.)
Even though Hansen did not meet Ibara, the facts
sufficiently establish a conspiracy between Ibara and Furmanski
to defraud.

Ibara and Ibara Land, therefore, are also

responsible for the fraudulent conduct of Furmanski.

(Cf.

Danzig v. Jack Grvnberg & Associates, supra, at p. 1141.)

Even

though the fraudulent behavior occurred years before the filing
of the dissolution action, contrary to appellants 1 argument,
Hansen is not precluded from asserting her rights to the
property.

Fraud was evidenced by the representations made fay

Furmanski, the concealment and existence of the repurchase
agreement and the damages to Hansen.

(BAJI (7th ed.) No. 1251.)

The statute of limitations does not accrue until the
aggrieved party discovers the fraud upon exercising a
reasonable duty to inquire.
(d) .)

(Code Civ. P r o c , § 338, subd.

W h e n t h e p a r t i e s a r e i n a c o n f i d e n t i a 1 i: e 1 a t i o n s; h i p ,

however, the duty of the defrauded to inquire does not arise
until the relationship is repudiated.

(Lee v. Escrow

Consultants, Inc. (1989) 21 0 Cal App.3d 915, 921 )

Although

Ibara and Ibara Land argue Hansen is foreclosed by estoppel and
laches from asserting her rights, there was no showing Hansen
was aware of the repurchase agreement until Ibara, years later,
claimed she had rights to the property.
Appellants also suggest the California Property Record

Act precludes Hansen from acquiring this property.

Since this

assertion is unaccompanied by proper discussion or citation, we
need not address it.

(Huntington Landmark Adult Community

Assn. v. Ross, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 1021; Atchlev v.
Citv of Fresno, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 647; Rossiter v.
Benoit. supra, 88 Cal.App.3d at pp. 710-711.)

Sanction Order Against Shelton
We are not persuaded by attorney Shelton's contention
that the May 24, 1989 $2,500 sanction order issued pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 was an abuse of the
court's discretion.

(Luke v. Baldwin-United Corp. (1985) 167

Cal.App.3d 664, 668.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 permits the court
to "order a . . . party's attorney . . .

to pay any reasonable

expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party
as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous
or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. • . . H

The

section was designed to enable courts to M'manage their
calendars and provide for the expeditious processing of civil
actions . • . . ,H

(County of Imperial v. Farmer (1988) 205

Cal.App.3d 479, 485.)

Attorneys who, in bad faith, use tactics

merely to delay are properly sanctioned.

(In re Marriage of

Ouinlan (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1417, 1422; Cosenza v. Kramer
(1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1100, 1102-1103.)

Additionally, while a

court may only sanction for actions occurring in that court
(Coast Sav. St Loan Assn. v. Black (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1494,
1500; cf. County of Imperial v. Farmer, supra, at p. 485), the
court may examine the history of the litigation in determining
the motives behind the actions being examined.

(E.g., Coast

Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Black, supra.)
Here, the trial court provided numerous reasons for
imposing sanctions upon Shelton, the attorney for Ibara Land.
These included, (1) mutilating a substitution of attorney form
so Hansen could not "determine an address where service of
process could be effected" on an order shortening time and (2)
filing a writ contrary to her statements made to the court.-15/

15/ The court found:
"1. Alda Shelton engaged in a cause of conduct designed to
frustrate the ends of justice by filing a substitution of
attorney when counsel for Respondent sought to serve an
application for an order shortening time. This was
accomplished by substituting Ibara in pro per in place of Alda
Shelton, and mutilat[ing] the substitution so that it was not
possible to determine an address where service of process could
be effected.
"2. On March 6, 1989, after trial had begun, counsel and
parties were involved in negotiations for settlement. Contrary
to her stated intention during the morning discussions, Shelton
as counsel for Ibara and/or Ibara Land Trading Company, filed a
petition for writ of prohibition during the noon recess. That
afternoon proceedings were conducted in open court in which all
parties, including Ibara, and Ibara Land Trading Company waived
the matters contained in the writ application. Shelton failed
to disclose the fact that she had filed such a writ with the
Court of Appeal, and the trial court was unaware of this fili..M
until the following day when the Court of Appeal called,
notifying the trial court of a temporary stay."
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The court found these incidents, as well as other conduct,^- /
to be in bad faith and solely intended to cause unnecessary
delay.
The part of the order discussing the filing of a writ
petition referred to statements made to the court during
settlement negotiations on the morning of March 6, 1989.
During discussions with the court, Shelton stated that no
actions would be taken to delay the case and any objections to
proceeding would be waived.

When this statement was made,

however, Shelton knew a writ was being filed in the appellate
court, the result of which was a stay.

(The stay was not

lifted until approximately 15 days later.)

By concealing the

fact that a writ was being filed, Shelton mislead and deceived
the court, a violation of her ethical obligations as an
attorney.

(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (d);12/ Rule of

•lis/ The court also found:
M

3. On April 3, 1989, Shelton filed another application
for a writ of prohibition with the Court of Appeal. This time,
the order of the names of the Petitioners was changed, and
Shelton failed to advise the appellate court of the previous
application. This delayed trial until April 5, 1989.
"4. It was also brought to the Court's attention that a
document associating Mr. Cipriano, co-counsel for Petitioner,
in this appeal was altered after his signature was affixed and
did not reflect his participation in the writ procedure.
"5. The Court concluded that the specific incidents noted
above, as well as other conduct which served to delay and
prevent the timely trial of this matter, were in bad faith and
were solely intended to cause unnecessary delay."
12/ "it is the duty of an attorney to do all of the following:
[Footnote continued.]

Prof. Conduct, rule 5-200, subd. (B);^- 7 Pi Sabatino v. State
Bar (1980) 27 Cal.3d 159, 162-164.)

Such deception is not

permitted, even if the attorney purports to be representing the
best interest of his or her client.
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 300, 315-316.)

(Rodqers v. State Bar

By failing to inform the court

and all parties of the true status of the matter, all planned
their schedules assuming the trial would proceed.

Due to the

very nature of litigation, Hansen's counsel would have expended
time and efforts anticipating that trial would proceed.

The

parties subsequently appeared, only to be forced to reconvene at
a later time because the stay was in effect.

Further, the court

and Hansen proceeded as if the parties were engaged in good
faith settlement negotiations, never anticipating these
discussions were a sham because of the impending filing of the
writ.

Such an abuse of the process demonstrates bad faith and

supports an award under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. 11/

. . . (d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him or her such means only as are consistent with
truth, and never seek to mislead the judge . . . by an artifice
or false statement of fact or law."
IB/ H In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a member: (B) Shall
not seek to mislead the judge . . . by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law.1*
12/ we are not persuaded by Shelton's statement that there were
"no grounds to conclude [Shelton] filed the Petition as a
bad-faith tactic to cause unnecessary delay." The series of
procedural maneuvers, the voluminous court file, the numerous
writs, the two appeals, the number of bankruptcy filings and
some of the arguments on appeal all demonstrate the entire
matter was prolonged as long as possible; these actions belie
Shelton's statement.

(In re Marriage of Gumahan (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 572; cf.
Cosenza v. Kramer, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 1100.)
Additionally, mutilating a substitution of attorney
form so Hansen could not effect service of process would also
justify the imposition of sanctions.

This action, in light of

all the surrounding circumstances, could reasonably be
interpreted as another action done simply to delay.20/
Shelton suggests the $2,500 sanction award cannot be
upheld because the only expenses incurred were those expended
in opposing the writ petition and that a trial court cannot
sanction for actions in another court.
for a number of reasons.
the record.

These arguments fail

First, it is an inaccurate reading of

Hansen's attorney did not ask only for the time

expended on the writ petition.

Hansen's attorney requested

$25,000 in sanctions, $19,240 of which was attributable to the
preparation of the writ petition.

Further, Hansen's attorney

noted his time was billed at $325 per hour and the time of his
associate was billed at $150.

The trial court, who was in the

best position to observe all of the circumstances involved in
the litigation including the amount of time involved and the
skill utilized by Hansen's attorney, was within its discretion
to determine that the reasonable value of the time expended due
to the dilatory and bad-faith actions of Shelton was $2,500. A

20/ Even if, as Shelton contends, this finding of fact was
supported only by hearsay, the finding relating to deceiving
the trial court would be sufficient by itself to support the
sanction award.

precise memorandum was not required,

(Cf. Melnyk v. Robledo

(1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-625.)
Shelton also contends the motion for sanctions failed
to comply with procedural requirements because it did not
adequately apprise her of the legal basis for the motion and
did not contain points and authorities.

However, the sanction

motion indicated that sanctions were being sought pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, identified the offending
actions as frivolous and "intended solely to cause unnecessary
delay,M noted that the course of conduct was pervasive
throughout the litigation of the matter, specifically
identified numerous delaying tactics including the intentional
concealment of the filing of the writ petition in contradiction
to statements made by Shelton, and discussed the mutilation of
the substitution of attorney.

Thus, contrary to Shelton's

contention, the document satisfied the notice requirements of
California Rules of Court, rule 313.
Since we are affirming the sanction award/ as
required/ we have directed the clerk of this court to refer
this matter to the State Bar of California for a determination
as to whether discipline should be imposed.

(Bus. & Prof.

Code, § 6086.7/ subd. (c).)

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
to respondent Gail Hansen Furmanski.

Costs on appeal are awarded

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GRIGNON, J.
We concur:

TURNER, P.J.

JACKSON, J.*
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gid judgments as the superior court would
jjavc in such case, except that if the case was
pied anew in the superior court, the reviewing
eourt shall have similar power to review any
matter and make orders and judgments as it
lias in a case within the original jurisdiction of
the superior court. Added Stats 1968 ch 385
J 2. Within & Epstein, Criminal Law (2d ed)
$3270; Witkin Procedure (3d ed) Courts
£$249, 252, 254, 266; Writs §113; Appeal
i§ 18, 34, 725, 729; Cal Jur 3d Appellate
Review §§ 16, 685, 686.
{ 912. Certified copy of judgment or order of
reriewing court; Remittance to trial court;
Doty of clerk of trial court. Upon final determination of an appeal by the reviewing court,
the clerk of the court shall remit to the trial
court a certified copy of the judgment or order
of the reviewing court and of its opinion, if
iny. The clerk of the trial court, or the judge,
if there be no clerk, shall file such certified
copy of the judgment and opinion of the
reviewing court, shall attach the same to the
judgment roll if the appeal was from a judgment, and shall enter a note of the judgment
of the reviewing court stating whether the
judgment or order appealed from has been
affirmed, reversed or modified, in the margin
tf the original entry of such judgment or
arder, and also in the register of actions or
locket. Added Stats 1968 ch 385 § 2. Witkin
Procedure (3d ed) Courts § 254; Appeal §§ 598,
W; 5 Cal Jur 3d Appellate Review §§ 604,
$07.

§916

§913. Dismissal of appeal with prejudice;
Exception. The dismissal of an appeal shall be
with prejudice to the right to file another
appeal within the time permitted, unless the
dismissal is expressly made without prejudice
to another appeal. Added Stats 1968 ch 385
§ 2. Witkin Procedure (3d ed) Appeal §§ 508,
528; Cal Jur 3d Appellate Review §§ 398, 581
§ 914. Phonographic report of trial; Impossibility of transcription; Setting aside or vacating judgment, eta; New trial. When the right
to a phonographic report has not been waived
and when it shall be impossible to have a
phonographic report of the trial transcribed by
a stenographic reporter as provided by law or
by rule, because of the death or disability of a
reporter who participated as a stenographic
reporter at the trial or because of the loss or
destruction, in whole or in substantial part, of
the notes of such reporter, the trial court or a
judge thereof, or the reviewing court shall
have power to set aside and vacate the judgment, order or decree from which an appeal
has been taken or is to be taken and to order
a new trial of the action or proceeding. Added
Stats 1968 ch 385 §2. Witkin & Epstein,
Criminal Law (2d ed) §3244; Witkin Procedure (3d ed) Attack § 19; Appeal §§ 458, 459;
Cal Jur 3d Appellate Review §§57, 291, New
Trial§64.
§915.
Enacted 1872 and amended and
renumbered § 113a by Stats 1933 ch 743 § 25.

CHAPTER 2
Stay of Enforcement and Other Proceedings
ection
916.
917.1.
917.15.
917.2.
917.3.
917.4.
917.5.
917.6.
917.65.
917.7.

Stay of proceedings on perfecting appeal; Effect.
Undertaking to stay enforcement of money judgment or order pending appeal.
Appeal from certain orders concerning hazardous waste.
Appeal from judgment or order for assignment or delivery of documents or
personal property; Placing property in custody of officer of court; Furnishing
undertaking; Judgment or order directing sale of perishable property.
Appeal from judgment or order directing execution of instruments.
Undertaking to stay enforcement of judgment or order directing disposition of real
property pending appeal.
Appeal from judgment or order appointing receiver, Undertaking.
Appeal from judgment or order directing performance of acts specified in
§§917.1-917.5.
Undertaking to stay enforcement of order.
(First of two; Operative until January 1, 1994) Appeal from judgment or order
affecting custody or right of visitation of minor or exclusion from family
dwelling; Provisions regarding removal of minor from State.
Beginning in 1992,
italics indicate changes or addition*. * • *
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917.7.

(Second of two; Operative January 1, 1994) Appeal from judgment or order
affecting custody or right of visitation of minor or exclusion from family
dwelling; Provisions regarding removal of minor from State.
917.8.
Appeal involving party adjudged guilty of usurpation, etc., of public office, or
judgment or order directing right of inspection of corporate books, etc..
917.9.
Appeal from judgment or order in cases not otherwise provided for; Undertaking.
918.
Stay of enforcement of judgment or order by trial court; Limitation of power.
918.5.
Stay to protect possible set-off.
919.
Appeal by executor, administrator, etc.; Dispensation or limitation of security by
trial court.
921.
Appeal by party levying attachment; Requisites and conditions of undertaking.
922.
Effect of insufficiency of undertaking.
923.
Powers of reviewing court or judge; Chapter provisions as not limiting.
936.1.
Notice of appeal; Indigents.
Witkin Procedure (3d ed) EnfJudgm §§60, 183; Appeal § 174; Cal Jur 3d (Rev) Creditors*
Rights and Remedies §250; Cal Jur 3d Appellate Review §§ 182, 195, 203, 243, 656.
§ 916. Stay of proceedings on perfecting appeal; Effect (a) Except as provided in Sections
917.1 to 917.9, inclusive, and in Section
116.810, the perfecting of an appeal stays
proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the
matters embraced therein or affected thereby,
including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any
other matter embraced in the action and not
affected by the judgment or order,
(b) When there is a stay of proceedings other
than the enforcement of the judgment, the
trial court shall have jurisdiction of proceedings related to the enforcement of the judgment as well as any other matter embraced in
the action and not affected by the judgment or
order appealed from. Amended Stats 197S ch
266 § 5; Stats 1982 ch 497 § 64, operative July
1, 1983; Stats 1990 ch 1305 § 8 (SB 2627).
Witkin Procedure (3d ed) Actions §273; Appeal §§6, 7, 9, 175, 205, 206, 219; Witkin
Summary (9th ed) Trusts §309; Cal Jur 3d
Administrative Law §340, Appellate Review
§§173, 174, 182, 184, 192, 241, 242, Decedents' Estates §418, Venue §80; Cal Fam L
Serv §35:56; Miller & Starr, Cal Real Estate
2d § 9:17a
§917.
Enacted 1872 and amended and
renumbered § 113c by Stats 1933 ch 743 § 27.
§ 917.1. Undertaking to stay enforcement of
money judgment or order pending appeal, (a)
The perfecting of an appeal shall not stay
enforcement of the judgment or order in the
trial court if the judgment or order is for
money or directs the payment of money,
whether consisting of a special fund or not,
and whether payable by the appellant or another party to the action, unless an undertaking is given.
R*n

(b) The undertaking shall be on condition that
if the judgment or order or any part of it is
affirmed or the appeal is withdrawn or dismissed, the party ordered to pay shall pay the
amount of the judgment or order, or the part
of it as to which the judgment or order is
affirmed, as entered after the receipt of the
remittitur, together with any interest which
may have accrued pending the appeal and
entry of the remittitur, and costs which may
be awarded against the appellant on appeal.
This section shall not apply in cases where the
money to be paid is in the actual or constructive custody of the court; and such cases shall
be governed, instead, by the provisions of
Section 917.2. The undertaking shall be for
double the amount of the judgment or order
unless given by an admitted surety insurer in
which event it shall be for one and one-half
times the amount of the judgment or order.
The liability on the undertaking may be enforced if the party ordered to pay does not
make the payment within 30 days after the
filing of the remittitur from the reviewing
court
(c) If a surety on the undertaking pays the
judgment, either with or without action, after
the judgment is affirmed, the surety is substituted to the rights of the creditor and is
entitled to control, enforce, and satisfy the
judgment, in all respects as if the surety had
recovered the judgment
(d) Costs awarded by the trial court under
Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 1021) of
Title 14 shall be included in the amount of the
judgment or order for the purpose of applying
subdivisions (a) and (b). Amended Stats 1981
ch 196 § 1; Stats 1982 ch 517 § 155; Stats 1986
ch 1174 § 1. Witkin Procedure (3d ed) Prov
Rem §22; EnfJudgm §403; Appeal §§18,

Beginning m 1992,
italics indicate chances or additions. • • • indicate
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§ 917.4

182 et seq; Cal Jur 3d (Rev) Ejectment and of the undertaking. If the judgment or order
Related Remedies § 74; Cal Jur 3d Appellateappealed from directs the sale of perishable
Review §§ 192, 198, 202, 214, 215, Suretyshipproperty the trial court may order such propand Guaranty §§2, 86 et seq; Cal Fam L Serverty to be sold and the proceeds thereof to be
deposited with the clerk of the trial court to
§35:59.
abide the order of the reviewing court; such
§917.15. Appeal from certain orders con- fact shall be considered by the court in fixing
cerning hazardous waste. The perfecting of an the amount of the undertaking. Added Stats
appeal shall not stay enforcement of the judg- 1968 ch 385 § 2; Amended Stats 1972 ch 546
ment or order in the trial court if the judgment § 2. Witkin Procedure (3d ed) Appeal §§ 182 et
or order appealed from, or the administrative seq., 212, 221, 238; Cal Jur 3d Appellate Reorder which is the subject of the trial court view §§ 187, 198, 199, 202, 212, Suretyship and
proceeding, was issued pursuant to either of Guaranty §§2, 82.
the following:
(a) Subdivision (a) of Section 25358.3 of the § 917.3. Appeal from judgment or order diHealth and Safety Code and ordered a respon- recting execution of instruments. The perfectsible party to take appropriate removal or ing of an appeal shall not stay enforcement of
remedial actions in response to a release or a the judgment or order in the trial court if the
judgment or order appealed from directs the
threatened release of a hazardous substance.
execution of one or more instruments unless
(b) Section 25181 of the Health and Safety the instrument or instruments are executed
Code and ordered the party to comply with and deposited in the office of the clerk of the
Chapter 6.5 (commencing with Section 25100) court where the original judgment or order is
of Division 20 of the Health and Safety Code entered to abide the order of the reviewing
or any rule, regulation, permit, covenant, stan- court. Added Stats 1968 ch 385 § 2. Witkin
dard, requirement, or order issued, adopted or Procedure (3d ed) Appeal §§ 212, 225, 238; Cal
executed pursuant to that Chapter 6.5. Added Jur 3d Appellate Review § 197, Suretyship and
Stats 1985 ch 1492 § 1.
Guaranty § 2.
§ 917 J . Appealfromjudgment or order for § 917.4. Undertaking to stay enforcement of
assignment or delivery of documents or per- judgment or order directing disposition of real
sonal property; Placing property in custody of property pending appeal. The perfecting of an
officer of court; Furnishing undertaking; Judg- appeal shall not stay enforcement of the judgment or order directing sale of perishable ment or order in the trial court if the judgment
property. The perfecting of an appeal shall not or order appealed from directs the sale, constay enforcement of the judgment or order of veyance or delivery of possession of real propthe trial court if the judgment or order ap- erty which is in the possession or control of
pealed from directs the assignment or delivery the appellant or the party ordered to sell,
of personal property, including documents, convey or dehver possession of the property,
whether by the appellant or another party to unless an undertaking in a sum fixed by the
the action, or the sale of personal property trial court is given that the appellant or party
upon the foreclosure of a mortgage, or other ordered to sell, convey or dehver possession of
hen thereon, unless an undertaking in a sum the property will not commit or suffer to be
and upon conditionsfixedby the trial court, is committed any waste thereon and that if the
given that the appellant or party ordered to judgment or order appealed from is affirmed,
assign or dehver the property will obey and or the appeal is withdrawn or dismissed, the
satisfy the order of the reviewing court, and appellant shall pay the damage suffered by the
will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste and the value of the use and occupancy
damage to the property, and that if the judg- of the property, or the part of it as to which
ment or order appealed from is affirmed, or the judgment or order is affirmed, from the
the appeal is withdrawn or dismissed, the time of the taking of the appeal until the
appellant shall pay the damage suffered to delivery of the possession of the property. If
such property and the value of the use of such the judgment or order directs the sale of
property for the period of the delay caused by mortgaged real property and the payment of
the appeal. The appellant may cause the prop- any deficiency, the undertaking shall also proerty to be placed in the custody of an officer vide for the payment of any deficiency.
designated by the court to abide the order of Amended Stats 1982 ch 517 § 156. Witkin
the reviewing court, and such fact shall be Procedure (3d ed) Judgm § 82; Appeal §§ 187,
considered by the court in fixing the amount 188, 189, 191; Cal Jur 3d (Rev) Ejectment and
Beginning in 1992,
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§ 917.4

DEERING'S CIVIL PROCEDURE

§ 917.7. (First of two; Operative until January 1, 1994) Appeal from judgment or order
affecting custody or right of visitation of minor or exclusion from family dwelling; Provisions regarding removal of minor from State.
The perfecting of an appeal shall not stay
§ 917.5. Appeal from judgment or order ap- proceedings as to those provisions of a judgpointing receiver; Undertaking. The perfecting ment or order which award, change, or otherof an appeal shall not stay enforcement of the wise affect the custody, including the nght of
judgment or order m the trial court if the visitation, of a minor child m any civil action,
judgment or order appealed from appoints a in an action filed under the Juvenile Court
receiver, unless an undertaking m a sum fixed Law, o r i n a special proceedmg, or the proviby the trial court is given on condition that if sions of a judgment or order for the temporary
the judgment or order is affirmed or the appeal exclusion of a party from the family dwelling
is withdrawn, or dismissed, the appellant will or the dwelling of the other party, as provided
pay all damages which the respondent may in Section 4359 of the Civil Code. However,
sustain by reason of the stay m the enforce- the tnal court may m its discretion stay exement of the judgment. Amended Stats 1982 ch cution of such provisions pending review on
517 § 157. Within Proceaure (3d ed) Writs appeal or for such other penod or penods as
§ 54; Appeal §§ 190, 191; Cal Jur 3d Appellate to it may appear appropnate. Further, m the
Review §§ 201, 202, Suretyship and Guaranty absence of a wnt or order of a reviewing court
§2.
providing otherwise, the provisions of the
§ 917.6. Appeal from judgment or order di- judgment or order allowing, or eliminating
recting performance of acts specified in restrictions against, removal of the minor
§§ 917.1-917.5. The perfecting of an appeal child from the state are stayed by operation of
shall not stay enforcement of the judgment or law for a penod of 30 days from the entry of
order m the trial court if the judgment or the judgment or order and are subject to any
order appealed from directs the performance further stays ordered by the tnal court, as
of two or more of the acts specified m Sections herein provided. Amended Stats 1981 ch 714
917.1 through 917.5, unless the appellant com- §70 Within Procedure (3d ed)l. Appeal
plies with the requirements of each applicable §§177, 178, 180, 181; Witkin Summary (9th
section. Added Stats 1968 ch 385 § 2. CalJur ed) Husband & Wife §§ 79, 140; Cal Jur 3d
3d Appellate Review §202, Suretyship and (Rev) Guardianship and Conservatorship
§280: Cal Jur 3d Appellate Review §189,
Guaranty § 2.
Suretyship and Guaranty § 2.
§ 917.65. Undertaking to stay enforcement
of order. The perfecting of an appeal shall not § 917.7. (Second of two; Operative January
stay enforcement of a right to attach order 1, 1994) Appeal from judgment or order afunless an undertaking is given. The undertak- fecting custody or right of visitation of minor
ing shall be m the amount specified m the nght or exclusion from family dwelling; Provisions
to attach order as the amount to be secured by regarding removal of minor from State. The
the attachment. The undertaking shall be on perfecting of an appeal shall not stay proceedcondition that if the nght to attach order is ings as to those provisions of ajudgment or
not reversed and the plaintiff recovers judg- order which award, change, or otherwise afment m the action m which the nght to attach fect the custody, including the nght of visitaorder was issued, the appellant shall pay the tion, of a minor child m any civil action, m an
amount of the judgment, together with any action filed under the Juvenile Court Law, or
mterest which may have accrued. The liabihty m a special proceedmg, or the provisions of a
on the undertaking may be enforced if the judgment or order for the temporary exclusion
judgment is not paid within 30 days after it of a party from the family dwelling or the
becomes final If a surety on the undertaking dwelling of the other party, as provided in the
pays the judgment, either with or without Family Code. However, the tnal court may in
action, the surety is substituted to the nghts of its discretion stay execution of such provisions
the creditor and is entitled to control, enforce, pending review on appeal or for such other
and satisfy the judgment, m all respects as if penod or penods as to it may appear approthe surety had recovered the judgment. Added pnate. Further, m the absence of a wnt or
Stats 1983 ch 155 § 22.5, effective June 30, order of a reviewing court providing otherwise, the provisions of the judgment or order
1983, operative July 1, 1983.
Related Remedies § 74; Cal Jur 3d Appellate
Review §§ 197, 200, 202, 211 660, Limitation
of Actions § 33, Mechanics1 Liens § 168, Suretyship and Guaranty §§2, 83; Miller & Starr,
Cal Real Estate 2d §§ 9:170, 18:151.
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